Submarine implosion animation
A new shocking relevation has emerged about Oceangate, the company responsible for building the Titan submersible, on which five people were killed on a trip to see the wreck of the Titanic in June.
In has been revealed that a former OceanGate employee, David Lochridge, raised serious concerns about the safety of the ill-fated Titan submarine before the incident.
Lochridge, who served as the director of marine operations at OceanGate from 2015 to 2018, was reportedly fired after consistently voicing apprehensions throughout the submarine’s construction process.
According to Lochridge, his warnings about safety issues were ‘repeatedly disregarded’ as the company focused on progressing from construction to testing.
Lochridge’s concerns were initially expressed in late 2017 while working on the factory floor.
Read more OceanGate CEO ‘asked accountant to pilot’ sub after firing ex-captain [INSIGHT]
David Lochridge warned about the safety of the submarine before being fired (Image: OceanGate)
In an email sent to his colleague, Rob McCallum, shortly after his dismissal, Lochridge shared his worries about the potential risks that CEO Stockton Rush’s actions could pose. Lochridge specifically highlighted Rush’s ego-driven motivations, expressing genuine concern that this could lead to unfortunate consequences, including potential harm to Rush and others aboard the submersible.
According to The New Yorker, the email read: “I don’t want to be seen as a tattletale but I’m so worried he kills himself and others in the quest to boost his ego.
“I would consider myself pretty ballsy when it comes to doing dangerous things, but that sub is an accident waiting to happen.
“There’s no way on earth you could have paid me to dive the thing.”
Rush, a self-proclaimed “innovator” with a relentless drive to push the boundaries of passenger diving, was among the five individuals who tragically lost their lives during the ill-fated final voyage of the Titan submarine.
The incident unfolded when the pressure chamber of the vessel imploded at a perilous depth of approximately 3,800 metres, near the haunting resting place of the historic Titanic.
In the days leading up to the catastrophic dive, veteran diver Lochridge meticulously examined every intricate detail of the sub, a machine he was already intimately acquainted with. What he uncovered sent shockwaves through the industry, as a litany of alarming red flags emerged.
Startling revelations from court documents, stemming from a lawsuit that has since been resolved, shed light on Lochridge’s findings. Glaring issues included deteriorating glue on the seams of the sub’s critical ballast bags, posing a serious threat to its structural integrity. Furthermore, Lochridge identified mounting bolts carelessly placed, raising concerns of potential rupture and catastrophic failure.
Adding to the growing list of concerns, Lochridge discovered visible plunge holes on the sub’s ceiling faces, a troubling discovery given the Titan’s boast of superior craftsmanship. Notably, the vessel exhibited grooves that deviated from industry-standard parameters, raising questions about the precision and quality of its construction.
The lawsuit also highlighted alarming deficiencies, with reports of crucial components allegedly secured with the use of zip-ties, suggesting a disregard for proper safety protocols.
According to Lochridge, his warnings about safety issues were repeatedly disregarded (Image: Getty)
Lochridge’s apprehension grew further as he uncovered disturbing details about the sub’s interior. Of particular alarm were flammable flooring materials and an interior vinyl wrapping that, according to Lochridge, emitted highly toxic gases when ignited—a potentially lethal combination for those aboard.
However, amid the extensive inventory of potential safety hazards, Lochridge’s foremost concern rested with the carbon fiber core of the sub. This essential component, designed to sustain passengers at the icy depths where the Titanic wreckage lies, ultimately failed during the disastrous dive last month, tragically sealing the fate of those on board.
At roughly 6,000 pounds per square inch, the external water pressure surrounding the vessel exerted force from all directions on its crucial hull.
Of particular concern to Lochridge was the use of carbon fibre in the pressure chamber, a material that had not been extensively tested in deep ocean submersibles and was therefore deemed unpredictable.
Critics, including multiple experts, strongly criticised Rush for choosing this material, which, similar to interwoven strands of rope, exhibited strength under tension but proved more fragile when subjected to compression.
Even more disconcerting was OceanGate’s alleged decision to forgo seeking certification for this new technology and the absence of comprehensive long-term deepwater testing before the catastrophic failure occurred.
According to Lochridge’s lawsuit, the responsibility for this decision ultimately rested with Rush and Tony Nissen, the director of engineering at the Washington-based firm.
Lochridge claimed that, despite providing them with an engineering report outlining the aforementioned concerns, Rush and Nissen remained steadfast in their position, leading to literal “holes” being discovered in a section of the sub’s hull.
In light of these issues, Lochridge argued in his lawsuit, filed later that year in Seattle District Court, that the Titan required further testing to ensure the safety of both the submersible and its passengers, especially at “extreme depths.”
He wrote in his refusal to sigh off on the submarine: “Verbal communication of the key items I have addressed in my attached document have been dismissed on several occasions, so I feel now I must make this report so there is an official record in place.
“Until suitable corrective actions are in place and closed out, Cyclops 2 (Titan) should not be manned during any of the upcoming trials.”
According to a court document submitted in 2018, the company’s lawyers stated that Lochridge’s employment was terminated because he did not agree with the company’s research, plans, and safety protocols.
OceanGate also alleged that Lochridge intentionally sought to be fired, disclosing confidential information to others and deleting data from a company hard drive. They further claimed that he disregarded safety information provided by Titan’s lead engineer.
Lochridge had relocated from the UK to Washington to contribute to the development of the Titan, previously known as Cyclops 2. OceanGate referred to him as an “expert in the field of submarine operations and rescue”, emphasising his background as a former Royal Navy marine engineer and ship’s diver.
